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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is Third-Party Defendants-Respondents General Mills, Inc.'s and General Mills 
Operations, LLC's (collectively "General Mills") Response Brief responding to the Appellant's 
Brief filed by Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent Lincoln Land Company, LLC ("Lincoln 
Land") on April 20, 2017. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises out of a Judgment entered by the Honorable Dane H. Watkins dismissing 
Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment count with prejudice. To recover for unjust enrichment, a 
litigant must prove three (3) elements: "(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by 
the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit 
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without 
payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital 
Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 827, 275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012). This appeal focuses on the first of the 
foregoing elements. 
Judge Watkins dismissed Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment count because Lincoln Land 
failed to set forth a genuine issue of material fact that Lincoln Land actually conferred the benefit 
in question to Defendant LP Broadband, Inc. ("LP Broadband"). The alleged benefit at issue is 
LP Broadband's use, permitted by General Mills, of the rooftops ("Rooftops") located on certain 
grain elevators that Lincoln Land leased to General Mills. 
The disposition of Lincoln Land's appeal focuses on a narrow question of law regarding 
the "conferral" element of unjust enrichment: can a plaintiff cut out the middleman and recover 
1 
for unjust enrichment against a defendant if the benefit conferred upon the defendant was 
conferred by a third-party and, in any event, not the plaintiff seeking recovery? 
This issue has been decided by this Court. The answer is no, a plaintiff cannot recover in 
such circumstances. See Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 
275 P.3d 839 (2012) (affirming decision to dismiss unjust enrichment count on the grounds that 
the benefit obtained by the defendant was conferred by a third-party-not the plaintiff-and by 
suing defendant, plaintiff sought to "cut out the middleman"), Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. 
Bonneville Billing, 157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 (2014) (stating that recovery for unjust 
enrichment was improper because plaintiff did not confer a direct benefit to defendant), and 
Brewer v. Wash. RSA No. 8 Ltd. P'ship, 145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008) (affirming 
dismissal of unjust enrichment by the district court that rejected contention that mere 
unauthorized use of land constituted conferral of a benefit by plaintiff). By dismissing Lincoln 
Land's unjust enrichment count on the grounds that Lincoln Land failed to prove and/or 
demonstrate an issue of fact that Lincoln Land conferred a benefit upon LP Broadband, Judge 
Watkins made the right call, consistent with established Idaho case law. Judge Watkins' decision 
and judgment should be AFFIRMED. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. GENERAL MILLS AND LP BROADBAND ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT IN 
2000 FOR USE OF THE ROOFTOPS AND LP BROADBAND CONTINUED 
SUCH USE FOR THE NEXT FOURTEEN (14) YEARS. 
In March of 2000, General Mills entered into a Roof-top Rental Agreement ("Roof Top 
Agreement") with LP Broadband's predecessor, Microserv, for the use of "roof-top space on the 
2 
'Evans Grainery."' R. p. 27 (Complaint, Ex. C); see also R. p. 72 (Affidavit of Adam Gillings in 
Support of Objection to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Gillings Affidavit I") at 
ff 7-8). Under the Roof Top Agreement, LP Broadband agreed to pay $50.00 per month to 
General Mills for LP Broadband to locate its antennae equipment on the grain elevator roof-tops. 
Id. LP Broadband paid its monthly use fees to General Mills through April of 2014. R. p. 72 
(Gillings Affidavit I at ff 10-12). 
2. LINCOLN LAND PURCHASES THE ELEV ATOR AND ROOFTOPS IN 2006 AND 
LEASES THE SAME TO GENERAL MILLS IN 2010. 
On or about March 15, 2006, Lincoln Land purchased the Evans Grainery from then 
seller, Evans Grain Elevator. R. p. 268 (Affidavit of Counsel [Larren K. Covert] in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, ,r 3, Ex. A, at 9). In June of 2010, Lincoln Land leased the 
Evans Grainery to General Mills ("Lease"). R. p. 44 (Affidavit of Doyle H. Beck ("Beck 
Affidavit"), ,r 3); see also R. pp. 370-377 (Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("McLaughlin Declaration"), 
Ex. B (attaching the Lease disclosed by Lincoln Land in discovery)). 
The Lease, among other things, allows General Mills to use the Evans Grainery "without 
restriction" for the duration of the Lease. R. p. 370 (McLaughlin Declaration, Ex. B at ,r 4). The 
rental amount under the Lease for the Evans Grainery was $120,000.00 per year for the five (5) 
year term of the Lease. R. p. 370 (McLaughlin Declaration, Ex.Bat ,r 3). 
3. GENERAL MILLS PAYS LINCOLN LAND IN FULL FOR USE OF THE 
ELEVATORS AND ROOFTOPS AND LP BROADBAND CONTINUES TO USE 
THE ROOFTOPS. 
General Mills has paid Lincoln Land roughly $500,000.00 in payments under the Lease. 
3 
R. p. 394 (Declaration of Colleen Benson at 2). The Lease restricted subleasing, stating: "Tenant 
will not sublet the Property, or any part thereof, and will not assign this lease or any interest 
therein .... " R. p. 371 (McLaughlin Declaration, Ex. B at 1 11). Notwithstanding the Lease's 
restrictions on subleasing, Microserv and/or LP Broadband continued to pay General Mills to use 
the Rooftops for LP Broadband's antennae equipment, as they had done so since 2000. R. p. 72 
(Gillings Affidavit I at 1 10). Accordingly, there is no issue of fact that General Mills permitted 
LP Broadband use of the Rooftops and LP Broadband paid General Mills for such use, which 
occurred both prior to and after execution of the Lease. 
4. FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS LINCOLN LAND NEVER MADE CONCERNING 
LP BROADBAND'S USE OF THE ROOFTOPS. 
There is no evidence in the record that LP Broadband caused damage to the Rooftops. 
There is no evidence in the record that Lincoln Land planned to use the Rooftops for some 
purpose, but was prevented from doing so by General Mills or LP Broadband. There is no record 
that Lincoln Land wanted to lease the space out to a third-party. General Mills could have used 
the Rooftops in the exact same manner as LP Broadband and General Mills would not have had 
to pay Lincoln Land anything extra. 
C. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Lincoln Land alleges that LP Broadband was unjustly enriched because LP Broadband 
used the Rooftops owned by Lincoln Land and previously leased to General Mills, without 
Lincoln Land's permission. 
Lincoln Land does not dispute that it received rental payments from General Mills 
pursuant to the Lease for the entirety of the property, including the Rooftops. Lincoln Land also 
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does not dispute that LP Broadband paid General Mills for its use of the Rooftops. Rather, 
Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment claim is based on the allegation that "LP has not paid any 
amount to Lincoln Land for the use of Lincoln Land's property." R. pp. 17-18 (Complaint at 
,r 8). 
On or about December 16, 2015, LP Broadband brought its third-party complaint against 
General Mills, seeking implied indemnity. Lincoln Land and LP Broadband both moved for 
summary judgment soon after. General Mills opposed both motions and asked that the trial court 
dismiss both Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment count and LP Broadband's indemnity suit. 
The trial court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment ("Memorandum Decision") on or about May 18, 2016. The Memorandum Decision is 
thoughtful and well-reasoned. In its decision, the Court granted LP Broadband's summary 
judgment motion and dismissed Lincoln Land's suit on the grounds that it was undisputed that 
Lincoln Land did not confer the benefit in question to LP Broadband. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court properly found that the facts at bar are similar to those in Med. Recovery 
Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing, 157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 (2014), stating: 
In this case, just as in MRS, it was not the plaintiff's conduct that 
conferred a benefit on the defendant. General Mills, not Lincoln 
Land, conferred the benefit by granting LP Broadband permission 
to use the property's rooftop area. 
R. p. 500 (Memorandum Decision at 8). The Court also relied on Brewer v. Wash. RSA No. 8 
Ltd. P'ship, 145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008), noting that: 
The Supreme Court's statement that the Brewers "merely asserted 
that Inland Cellular' s use of the land was a benefit" appears to 
5 
indicate that the Idaho Supreme Court did not consider Inland 
Cellular 's use of the property without the Brewers' authorization 
to be sufficient, by itself, to establish that the Brewers conferred a 
benefit on Inland Cellular. 
R. p. 502 (Memorandum Decision at 10 ( emphasis added)). 
Judge Watkins entered a judgment ("Judgment") consistent with its Memorandum 
Decision in August 2016. 1 Lincoln Land appealed from the Judgment and submitted its opening 
brief. General Mills now submits its response. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard 
of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment." 
Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609, 612, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012) (quoting Vreeken v. 
Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009)). "The court must grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(a). "When an action will 
be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor 
of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at 
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City 
of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991). 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The argument section of this brief is divided into three (3) sections. Section A discusses 
1 The Judgment is dated July 17, 2016. However, the Judgment was actually signed by 
the Court in August. 
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the point that Judge Watkins properly determined that Lincoln Land failed to set forth evidence 
that it conferred a benefit, under Idaho law, to LP Broadband. Section B addresses how Judge 
Watkins' ruling is bolstered by several controlling Idaho cases. Section C refutes the primary 
arguments Lincoln Land raises in its opening brief. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The law regarding unjust enrichment is straightforward. A prima facie case for unjust 
enrichment exists where: "(1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment 
to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson, 152 Idaho at 827,275 P.3d 839 at 842. Judge 
Watkins correctly dismissed Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment count because it is undisputed 
that Lincoln Land did not confer a benefit to LP Broadband under Idaho case authority. 
A. JUDGE WATKINS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS No GENUINE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT THAT LINCOLN LAND DID NOT CONFER THE 
BENEFIT IN QUESTION TO LP BROADBAND AND THAT LP BROADBAND WAS 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
"To confer a benefit in the context of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must give the 
defendant an interest in money, land, or possessions, or perform services beneficial to, or at the 
request of, the other." MRS v. Bonneville Billing, 157 Idaho 395, 399, 336 P.3d 802, 806 (2008) 
(citing 42 C.J.S. IMPLIED CONTRACTS§ 9 (2013)). Thus, it is essential that the plaintiff be the one 
conferring the benefit in question. Id. ("Here, like the plaintiffs in both Stevenson and Beco 
Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463, 797 P.2d 863 (1990), MRS has not conferred 
any direct benefit on BBC') (emphasis added). Use and/or mere receipt of a benefit is not 
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sufficient to establish the first element of unjust enrichment. Compare Appellant's Brief at 25 
("The central issue is receipt of a benefit by defendant, not intentional conferral by the 
plaintiff') {emphasis in original); with MRS, 157 Idaho at 399, 336 P.3d at 806 {"The Beco Court 
noted that recovery under an unjust enrichment theory requires one party, the plaintiff, to give 
some benefit to the other party, the defendant"). 
Stevenson illustrates the foregoing points in factually similar circumstances. In Stevenson, 
the Stevensons sought to purchase a condominium from seller, Jefferson. 152 Idaho at 825,275 
P.3d at 840. The Stevensons and Jefferson executed a purchase agreement and the Stevensons 
deposited $38,000 in earnest money with Jefferson's broker, Windermere. Id. Windermere 
released the earnest money to Jefferson. Id. Jefferson then paid Windermere a $9,500 
commission based on a separate agreement that obligated Jefferson to pay Windermere whenever 
it procured a purchaser. Id. 
The deal went bad. Jefferson decided not to sell and did not return the earnest money. Id. 
The Stevensons filed suit against Windermere and Jefferson claiming unjust enrichment, but 
settled with Jefferson when Jefferson agreed to refund the earnest money, less the $9,500 paid to 
Windermere. Id. at 826, 275 P.3d at 841. The trial court dismissed the Stevensons' unjust 
enrichment claim and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so, the Court summarized the 
Stevensons' unjust enrichment claim against Windermere as follows: 
It is true that Jefferson conferred a benefit on Windermere. The 
Stevensons' argument, reduced to its essence, is that because they 
conferred a benefit upon Jefferson, and Jefferson conferred a 
benefit upon Windermere, they can cut out the middleman and 
directly recover from Windermere for unjust enrichment. 
8 
Id. at 827,275 P.3d at 842. 
This Court rejected the Stevensons' argument and concluded that their unjust enrichment 
claim against Windermere could not be maintained because the Stevensons did not confer the 
benefit in question. Rather, Jefferson conferred the $9,500 benefit on Windermere and thus, it 
was "not a benefit that the Stevensons conferred on Windermere." Id. at 829,275 P.3d at 844. 
Under Stevenson, this Court should affirm the Judgment. As in that case, use of the 
Rooftops was "not a benefit that [Lincoln Land] conferred on [LP Broadband]." Id. General 
Mills, not Lincoln Land, allowed LP Broadband to use a portion of the Evans Grainery. See 
R. p. 72 (Gillings Affidavit I at 2, ,r,r 8-14). There was-and is-no genuine dispute of fact on 
this point. Thus, similar to Stevenson, Lincoln Land's "argument, reduced to its essence, is that 
because they conferred a benefit upon [General Mills], and [General Mills] conferred a benefit 
upon [LP Broadband], [Lincoln Land] can cut out the middleman and directly recover from 
[LP Broadband] for unjust enrichment." Id. at 827,275 P.3d at 842. 
Based on Stevenson and the above authorities, Lincoln Land did not confer a benefit upon 
LP Broadband-there is no genuine issue of fact on this point-and LP Broadband is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the District Court properly entered judgment against 
Lincoln Land. It is also important to note that Stevenson was not a close call. This Court not only 
rejected the appellant's argument, but awarded fees against appellant on the grounds that the 
argument presented was frivolous, unreasonable, and without a basis in fact or law. Id. at 830, 
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275 P.3d at 845 (stating that the district court "found that the Stevensons presented no evidence 
that they, rather than Jefferson, conferred a benefit upon Windermere."). 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS IN LINE WITH MRS V. BONNEVILLE 
BILLING, 157 IDAHO 395, 336 P.3D 802 (2014) AND BREWER V. WASHINGTON, 
145 IDAHO 735,184 P.3D 860 (2008). 
As the District Court correctly concluded, the facts at bar are also similar to those in MRS 
v. Bonneville Billing, 157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 (2014) and Brewer v. Washington, 145 Idaho 
735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008). MRS involved a dispute between two collection agencies over a 
common debtor. The Court awarded MRS a judgment against the debtor for $1,868. MRS 
obtained a writ of garnishment and served it on the debtor's employer. When it came time for 
garnishment, the employer sent the funds to a different creditor, BBC. BBC was notified of the 
error and refused to tum over the monies. MRS demanded a return of the funds. BBC declined. 
MRS filed suit against BBC for unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary 
judgment, but on appeal this Court reversed on the basis that there was no direct benefit 
conferred from MRS to BBC. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on Stevenson and Beco 
Constr. According to the Court: 
Here, like the plaintiffs in both Stevenson and Beco, MRS has not 
conferred any direct benefit on BBC. To confer a benefit in the 
context of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must give the defendant 
an interest in money, land, or possessions, or perform services 
beneficial to, or at the request of, the other. See 42 C.J.S. Implied 
Contracts§ 9. MRS has done none of these things for the benefit of 
BBC. The benefit enjoyed by BBC in this case, funds from three 
checks totaling $1,083.21, was conferred on BBC by WSEC 
because WSEC sent the checks. In this respect, MRS' argument is 
very similar to the plaintiff's argument in Beco, who argued it 
could recover on an unjust enrichment theory for a benefit it did 
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not directly confer. It is also similar to the plaintiffs' argument in 
Stevenson that Windermere 's benefit resulted from a benefit they 
conferred on Jefferson. We rejected both those arguments. 
Likewise, we reject MRS' argument in this case. 
157 Idaho at 399, 336 P.3d at 806 (emphasis added). 
MRS is factually and legally on point. Just as the benefit conferred to BBC was by the 
employer and not MRS, here there is no genuine dispute that the "benefit was conferred on [LP 
Broadband] by [General Mills]." Id. In other words, "like the plaintiffs in both Stevenson and 
Beco, [Lincoln Land] has not conferred any direct benefit on [LP Broadband]." As a matter of 
law, that is fatal to Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment count2 and Stevenson and MRS 
demonstrate that the trial court reached the right conclusion under Idaho law.3 
Consistent with Stevenson and MRS, Brewer stands for the rule that mere use of property 
by a defendant-even unauthorized use-is not a substitute under unjust enrichment for the 
requirement that plaintiff actually confer the benefit in question to the defendant. In Brewer, the 
Brewers were tenants in common with other family members regarding certain property. Kinzer 
2 See McColm v. Baker, 139 Idaho 948, 950-51, 88 P.3d 767, 769-70 (2004) ("Judgment 
shall be granted to the moving party if the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish an essential element to the party's case"). 
3 Lincoln Land argues that MRS was predicated on a mistake not at issue here. This 
argument fails for at least two (2) reasons. First, the District Court correctly determined that "[i]f, 
as Lincoln Land argues, General Mills' decision to permit LP Broadband to use the rooftop was 
in violation of the Lease Agreement, that decision is analogous to WSEC' s mistake in MRS'' and 
that "[ s ]uch mistake or alleged breach of contract does not alter the fact that it was General Mills, 
not Lincoln Land, which conferred the benefit." R. p. 500 (Memorandum Decision at 8). Second, 
the portion of the MRS decision discussing mistake was not necessary to the Court's ruling. The 
MRS Court stated: "It is also worth noting that this case includes an additional fact rendering 
MRS' conduct and the benefit received by BBC even less direct than the situation we considered 
11 
managed the property and leased the towers on the property to Inland Cellular ("Inland"). 
According to the Brewers, they "never authorized Kinzer to enter into any of the leases, and prior 
to the signing of the leases, Kinzer never spoke with her nephews regarding the leases." This 
should sound familiar. 
The Brewers sued Inland for unjust enrichment based on nearly identical factual 
allegations as those in this case: because Inland retained a benefit from using the Brewers' 
property without the Brewers' authority, the Brewers conferred a benefit to Inland. The district 
court granted summary judgment to Inland. This Court affirmed, noting first that the trial court 
found that the Brewers: 
provided no evidence that they had conferred a benefit on Inland 
Cellular or that it had received a benefit. Instead, they merely 
asserted that Inland Cellular 's use of the land was a benefit. 
145 Idaho at 739 184 P.3d at 864 (emphasis added). 
This Court then noted that the Brewers "failed to point to a single fact in the record either 
below or on appeal that creates a genuine issue of material fact." Id. The Court's comments were 
in response, at least in part, to the same type of "use/authority to use" based arguments Lincoln 
Land presents on this appeal. As stated in the Brewers' opening brief to this Court: 
Inland Cellular entered into the lease without the consent of the 
Brewers and without the Brewers' ratification. This use of the 
Brewers' land is clearly for the benefit of Inland Cellular and the 
circumstances surrounding Inland Cellular's use of the land is 
inequitable to the Brewers. Madlynn Kinzer did not have any 
authority to enter into the leases with Inland Cellular on behalf of 
in Stevenson and Beco: mistake." The import of that statement is clear. Mistake was icing on the 
cake of an argument that was already flawed. 
12 
the Brewers and the Brewers never received any benefits from this 
lease. 
2007 WL 833521 (Idaho) {Appellate Brief) at *14 (emphasis added). 
As is the case with Stevenson and MRS, Brewer is on point. Similar to Brewer, Lincoln 
Land argues that LP Broadband's alleged unauthorized use ofland4 was a benefit conferred from 
plaintiff to defendant. The Brewer Court rejected that argument as conclusory, despite evidence 
in the appellate record that Inland-like LP Broadband-actually used the facilities in question, 
although such use may have been unauthorized. Id. at 740, 184 P.3d at 865 (J. Jones, 
concurring). 
The trial court correctly recognized this fact. See R. p. 502 (Memorandum Decision 
at 10) ("In his concurrence, Justice Jones indicates that Inland Cellular's predecessor in interest 
had constructed a facility on the property and that Inland Cellular continued to operate the 
facility. In light of this, the Supreme Court's statement that the Brewers 'merely asserted that 
Inland Cellular's use of the land was a benefit' appears to indicate that the Idaho Supreme Court 
did not consider Inland Cellular' s use of the property sufficient, by itself, to establish that the 
Brewers conferred a benefit on Inland Cellular."). 
The import of Brewer appears clear: mere unauthorized use of land does not equate with 
plaintiff conferring a benefit to a defendant. Therefore, Lincoln Land's focus on LP Broadband's 
4 General Mills disputes that the Roof Top Agreement breached the anti-sublease 
provision of the Lease. 
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unauthorized5 use does not alleviate Lincoln Land from its burden of setting forth evidence 
demonstrating that Lincoln Land, in particular, actually conveyed a direct benefit to 
LP Broadband. Lincoln Land failed to show an issue of fact on this point. Instead, like the 
appellant in Brewer, Lincoln Land only asserted that LP Broadband's unauthorized use of the 
Rooftops equates with Lincoln Land conferring a benefit on LP Broadband. This is counter to 
Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. Judge Watkins correctly rejected Lincoln Land's arguments and 
entered judgment as a matter of law against Lincoln Land. 
5 Judge Watkins' decision does a nice job of dealing with Lincoln Land's attempt to 
distinguish Brewer on the grounds that while the appellant in Brewer failed to show a below 
market lease, Lincoln Land submitted such evidence. As Judge Watkins noted, whether LP 
Broadband enjoyed a below market lease from General Mills goes to whether it would be 
inequitable to allow LP Broadband to retain the benefit. That, however, is not proof that Lincoln 
Land conferred a benefit to LP Broadband. In fact, it is the opposite-proof that General Mills 
conferred the benefit in question. As Judge Watkins stated: 
This Court acknowledges that, unlike the plaintiff in Brewer, 
Lincoln Land has clearly supported its allegation of a below-
market value lease, sufficient to create a question of fact on that 
issue. The value of the lease, however, relates more directly to the 
third element in a cause of action for unjust enrichment. Because 
the benefit was conferred by General Mills and not Lincoln Land, 
this Court need not consider whether the lease payment was below 
market value. The fact remains that Lincoln Land did not, as a 
matter oflaw, confer a benefit on LP Broadband, as defined by the 
Court in MRS and Brewer. 
R. p. 502 (Memorandum Decision at 10). 
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C. LINCOLN LAND'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT PERSUASIVE AND ARE DIRECTLY 
CONTRADICTED BY CASE AUTHORITY. 
Lincoln Land presents a host of arguments attempting to explain why its unjust 
enrichment count should survive summary judgment. However, Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer 
control this appeal. Accordingly, it is unclear how necessary it is to wade into Lincoln Land's 
arguments. Nonetheless, these arguments lack merit and should be rejected. 
1. ANY MINOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FACTS AT BAR AND THOSE IN 
STEVENSON, MRS, AND BREWER ARE FAR OUTWEIGHED BY THEIR 
OVERWHELMING SIMILARITIES. 
Lincoln Land's briefing is, at its heart, an attempt to distinguish MRS and Brewer (There 
is little to no discussion of Stevenson, which is also on point.) Perhaps there are differences-
minor ones, at best-between the facts in this case and the facts of Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. 
However, the similarities are immense and the facts of this case fall in line and are consistent 
with Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. Those authorities control and this Court should follow them 
and affirm Judge Watkins' Judgment. 
2. LINCOLN LAND'S RELIANCE ON IDAHO LUMBER, INC. V. BUCK, 109 
IDAHO 737,710 P.2D 647 (CT.APP.1985) IS UNAVAILING. 
Lincoln Land cites Idaho Lumber-a 1985 Court of Appeals case-to support the 
proposition that a plaintiff does not need to confer a benefit to a defendant to sustain an unjust 
enrichment claim. Appellant's Brief at 22. It is enough, according to Lincoln Land, that the 
benefit in question simply be appropriated by a defendant. Appellant's Brief at 22 (stating that a 
defendant "should be required to make restitution of or for property or benefits received, 
retained, or appropriated ... ") (citing Idaho Lumber, 109 Idaho at 746). This is not correct. 
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In addition to Idaho Lumber being factually distinguishable, the quote Lincoln Land 
utilizes from that case does not address the conferral element. Appellant's Brief at 22. Rather, the 
quote references whether it would be inequitable to retain the claimed benefit. 6 Judge Watkins 
did not dismiss Lincoln Land's suit on that basis and, therefore, the quote is not relevant. In 
contrast, Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer, directly address the factual and legal issues in this case 
and represent the governing case authority regarding what constitutes a conferral of a benefit. 
3. LINCOLN LAND'S RELIANCE ON IDAHO CODE § 55-607 IS MISPLACED. 
Lincoln Land's briefing focuses heavily on Idaho Code § 55-607 and whether General 
Mills could or could not have conveyed a lawful estate to LP Broadband. This discussion is not 
relevant and should be rejected for at least the following reasons. 
First, the critical inquiry on appeal is not whether, under Idaho law, LP Broadband 
received a lawful estate in land from General Mills, but whether Lincoln Land, the plaintiff, met 
its burden and showed that it conferred a benefit to LP Broadband, the defendant. MRS, 157 
6 The opinion states, in relevant part: The next question is whether it was unjust for Buck 
to retain any of the enrichment. 
The phrase "unjust enrichment" is used in law to characterize the result or 
effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received 
under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to 
account therefor. It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines 
and remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich 
himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution 
of or for property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is 
just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action 
involves no violation or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, 
either directly or indirectly. [Footnotes omitted.] 
109 Idaho at 746, 710 P.2d at 656 (emphasis added). 
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Idaho at 399, 336 P.3d at 806 ("The Beco Court noted that recovery under an unjust enrichment 
theory requires one party, the plaintiff, to give some benefit to the other party, the defendant"). 
By focusing on the legal estate that General Mills could or could not have conveyed to 
LP Broadband, Lincoln Land gets afield of unjust enrichment analysis and Lincoln Land's 
burden of proving that it-not someone else-conferred the benefit in question on 
LP Broadband. 
Second, Lincoln Land cites no Idaho case authority supporting Lincoln Land's position 
that conferral of a benefit focuses on the party that had the authority to convey the benefit and 
not whether that party actually conferred a direct benefit to the defendant. The latter was the 
critical inquiry set forth in Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. To survive summary judgment, a 
plaintiff must set forth evidence that plaintiff conferred to the defendant the benefit in question. 
Lincoln Land provided no such evidence to the District Court. 
4. LINCOLN LAND'S BRIEF CONTAINS SEVERAL STATEMENTS OF LAW 
THAT ARE INCORRECT. 
Lincoln Land's opening brief contains statements that are not consistent with Idaho law. 
For example, Lincoln Land writes that "[t]he District Court requirement of a direct link between 
plaintiff and defendant is not supported by Idaho case law regarding unjust enrichment." 
Appellant's Brief at 22. Not so. That is exactly what the law is and failure to adhere to that 
requirement is what this Court was alluding to in Stevenson when it referred to plaintiff's 
unsuccessful attempt to "cut out the middleman." Same as in MRS. MRS, 157 Idaho at 399, 336 
P.3d at 806 ("Here, like the plaintiffs in both Stevenson and Beco, MRS [the plaintiff] has not 
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conferred any direct benefit on BBC [the defendant]"). 
Lincoln Land also writes that the Court in Idaho Lumber stated that an unjust enrichment 
claim may be sustained without an intentional act by the plaintiff. Appellant's Brief at 22. 
According to Lincoln Land: 
By inclusion of the term "appropriated", the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that a claim for unjust enrichment may be established without 
any intentional act on the part of the plaintiff when the defendant 
has taken a benefit to serve the defendant's own use or pleasure. 
Appellant's Brief at 22 (emphasis in original). 
This statement is problematic. First, as noted, Idaho Lumber is not a Supreme Court case 
and Lincoln Land's statements otherwise are not correct. Second, even if it were, as noted, supra, 
the Court of Appeals' discussion of "appropriation" was within the context of whether it would 
be inequitable to retain a benefit-not in the context at issue in this case of whether plaintiff 
conferred a benefit to defendant. Thus, while perhaps an "intentional act on the part of the 
plaintiff' is not required, actually conferring a benefit on the defendant is.7 That is precisely what 
this Court stated in Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. Actually conferring a benefit on LP Broadband 
7 Lincoln Land repeats its reference to the fact that the District Court imposed a 
requirement that to constitute conferral of a benefit, it must emanate from an intentional act of 
the plaintiff. See e.g. Appellant's Brief at 25. However, the District Court never read an intent 
requirement into the benefit conferral element. Rather, Judge Watkins simply analyzed whether 
Lincoln Land was the party that actually conferred the benefit to LP Broadband. See R. p. 502 
(Memorandum Decision at 10) ("The fact remains that Lincoln Land did not, as a matter of law, 
confer a benefit on LP Broadband, as defined by the Court in MRS and Brewer."); R. p. 500 (id. 
at 8) ("In this case, just as in MRS, it was not the plaintiffs conduct that conferred a benefit on 
defendant. General Mills, not Lincoln Land, conferred the benefit by granting LP Broadband 
permission to use the property's rooftop area"). 
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is precisely what Lincoln Land did not do in this case. Therefore, LP Broadband was entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The District Court's reasoning and decision were spot-on regarding the legal and factual 
issues it addressed. The Court went through the controlling authorities on the material issues and 
properly applied those authorities to the facts. General Mills asks that this Court follow the 
precedent set forth in Stevenson, MRS, and Brewer. Doing so leads to one result: affirming the 
Judgment entered by the Honorable Dane H. Watkins. 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May, 2017. 
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